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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRU;ST 
COMPANY, a, corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EUGENE R. THO'RUP, 
Defendant and App.ellant, 
IDA VfOLA THORUP LAYTON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 8691 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST ATEMEN·T OF FACTS 
Respondent as Administrator of the Estate of 
Nettie N. Thorup, deceased, filed its complaint 
against Eugene R. Thorup and Ida Viola Thorup 
Layton. The complaint is a simple complaint to quiet 
title in plaintiff. :This complaint alleges plaintiff's 
appointment as Administrator, and that deceased 
was owner of two parcels of realty described at the 
time of her death, and that defendants are heirs 
of said deceased, and that plaintiff is entitled to 
possession of said realty, and prays that title be 
quieted in plaintiff as representative of the Estate 
of Nettie N. Thorup. 
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Defendants answered that deeds were duly 
executed by Nettie N. Thorup to defendants on the 
26th Day of July, 1950, and duly delivered to de-
fendants during the lifetime of Nettie N. Thorup. 
She died on February 23, 1955. Plaintiff replied 
to the answers simply by admitting defendant, Eu-
gene R. Thorup, is in possession of the property, 
and denying other allega~ions of defendants' an-
swers. 
At the beginning of the trial plaintiff and 
respondent herein introduced the two Warranty 
Deeds dated as aforesaid, naming Nettie N. Thorup 
as grantor (Ex. 1) one to Eugene R. Thorup as 
grantee, and the other to Mrs. Layton as grantee. 
(Ex. 2) Attorney for plai11tiff announced thereupon 
that he intended to prove by expert testimony that 
the two deeds are forgeries. Defendants thereupon 
objected to such procedure as not within the plead-
ings. ( Tr. 2) The trial judge overruled the objection 
without an opportunity for defendants' attorney 
to be heard, or present authorities supporting the 
objection, and ordered plai11tiff to proceed. 
E11dorsements on Utah Power & Light checks 
payable to Nettie N. Thorup 'vere introduced, and 
Percy Goddard, who had picked two checks with 
endorsements and evidently had enlarged photo-
graphs of them n1ade. He testified to the differences 
in the endorsements and the signatures on the deeds. 
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These differences were principally in the "T" in 
Thorup, and the "N" in Nettie, and concluded, there-
fore, that the signature on the deeds were forgeries. 
The defference in the "T" consisted, he said, in 
1naking the "1T" in one stroke in the two endorse-
ments, and in two strokes on the deeds. This testi-
mony, even in the face of testimony of Louis Thorup, 
who, as plain tiff's witness, testified that sometimes 
the deceased wrote the "'T" one way and sometimes 
in two separate strokes (Trans. -6-Rec. 26) The 
"N", said Goddard, in the two endorsements has the 
second loop lower than the first, but on the deeds 
they were about the same height. It further appeared 
that plaintiff's vvitness, Louis Thorup, had obtained 
the endorsements at night (Transo 20) with his 
help in 90 ro of the cases (Trans. 23) and cashed 
all but one at Fisher's Brewery. He also testified 
that Mrs. Thorup was nearsighted and sometimes 
signed the check without using her glasses (Tr. 24) 
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup testified that he 
was personally present on July 26, 1950, and saw 
Mrs. Thorup sign said deeds in bright daylight vvith 
her glasses on. Also that under instruction of James 
l\11. Carlson, Mrs. Thorup delivered the deed (Ex-
hibit 1) to him. Also that James M. Carlson was 
present and saw her sign the deeds, and she acknowl-
edged the execution to and before him. 
James M. Carlson testified to preparation of 
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the deeds after two interviews with Mrs. Nettie 
N. Thorup, who had called him for interviews. Also 
he testified she, Et1gene R. Thorup and he had to-
gether measured the property conveyed to Eugene 
on the second visit after examination of abstracts 
delivered to him by 1\frs. Thorup. On the date the 
deeds bear Mrs. Thorup called James M. Carlson 
and said to bring the deeds i11 the daytime on a 
bright day. That afternoon she, in bright daylight 
with her glasses on, slowly signed the two deeds 
and handed Eugene's to him after acknowledgment 
as appears on the deed. (Tr. 84) 
On Motion for a New Trial defendant present-
ed twelve other checks payable to Nettie N. Thorup 
and apparently endorsed by her and cashed by Louis 
Thorup at Fisher Brewing Company. The twelve 
checks clearly showed that the "T" was more often 
than not signed in two separate strokes, and the 
"N" had the two loops the same height. Clearly wit-
ness Goddard had picked out for comparison two 
endorsements only, which were different from the 
deed signatures, and not l(nO"\ving whether Louis 
Thortlp in effect signed or guided Mrs. Thorup's 
hand or not on his night visits. Goddard sat in a 
jury seat all the time Louis Thorup testified. 
Defendant filed an Affidavit of Bias on objec-
tion to Judge Van Cott's hearing· the Motion for a 
New Trial. This the Judge overruled, ( Rec. 117) , 
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and Judge VanCott, Jr., insisted on his hearing the 
Motion for a Nevi Trial, and denied same after 
arguments and presentation of the filed Affidavits 
in support thereof and presentation of twelve dif-
ferent endorsements of Mrs. Thorup. (Rec. 118) 
POINT'S RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THAT THE PLEADINGS ARE A SIMPLE EQUITY 
CASE, BUT THE EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE WAS 
PERMITTED AND ERRONEOUSLY TAKEN AS IF IT 
WERE A FRAUD LAW CASE TO CANCEL DEEDS. 
POINT II. 
THE PROCEDURE AS IF IT WERE A FRAUD 
CASE TOOK DEFENDANTS BY SURPRISE. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE IS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF AP-
PELLANT'S DEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY 
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THE 
DEEDS WERE FORGERIES. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT RE-
FERRING THE CAUSE ON AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
TO ANOTHER JUDGE. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL MADE 
ON GROUNDS OF SURPRISE, WRONGFUL PROCE-
DURE AND NEW EVIDENCE. 
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POINT I. 
THAT THE PLEADINGS ARE A SIMPLE EQUITY 
CASE, BUT THE EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE WAS 
PERMIT'rED AND ERRONEOUSLY TAKEN AS IF IT 
WERE A FRAUD LAW CASE TO CANCEL DEEDS. 
In support of appellant's contention may we cite 
the following authorities: 
Strong v. Strong, 140 Pac. (2d) 386, (Cal.) 
This was a suit to quiet title. Defendant's wife at-
tempted to prove fraud under general allegations of 
ownership. Court held: (at page 389, 9-10) 
"Any rights that she might have to the 
cancellation of the deed or to the declaration 
of a constructive trust are entirely equitable, 
(Rocha v. Rocha,, 197, Cal. 396, 240 P. 1010; 
F,arrar v. Steenberger, 159 Pac. 707; Freligh 
v. McGr,aw, 272 P. 791; Walsh Equity 492), 
and it is settled that such rights cannot be 
established in an action to quiet title when 
the pleadings contain merely general allega-
tions asserting defendant's ownership and 
denying that of plaintiff." 
Ostrom v. Jackson, 127 S.W. (2d) 987. The 
Court held: 
''A deed cannot be set aside on grounds 
not pleaded." 
7 4 C.J.S., page 75: 
"* * * The issues of fact which arise for 
determination in a suit to quiet title are those, 
and only those, which are properly presented 
by the pleadings * * *'' 
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Lel,and v. Bourne, 41 U. 125; 125 Pac. 652: 
A suit to quiet title in an equitable action. 
"This is an equity case to quiet the title 
to real property. In such a case both parties 
have a right to invoke our judgment upon the 
whole evidence. If in such a case in our judg-
ment the findings are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence, it is our duty to va-
cate the1n and substitute others. In this case 
in our judgment the findings are manifestly 
against the great weight of the evidence, and 
for that reason cannot be permitted to stand. 
* * *" 
Fares v. Urban, 46 U. 609, 151 Pac. 57. 
Here a simple complaint to quiet title. 
Plaintiff introduced evidence of adverse pos-
session. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff on 
appeal contended the case one in law, in effect 
an ejectment, and court is bound by findings, 
if any evidence to support them. 
"If the court try the case as an action 
in equity, the case must be considered as such 
by us.'' 
Appellant was and is in possession of the prop-
erty under claim under the deed. 
7 4 C.J.S., page 53: 
"Possession and action at law. As a gen-
eral rule, a holder of legal title to lands must, 
in order to maintain an action to quiet title 
or remove a cloud, be in possession of the land 
when the action is instituted since, where de-
fendant is in possession, the remedy at law 
by action of ejectment affords a plain, ade-
quate, and complete remedy." 
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POINT II. 
THE PROCEDURE AS IF IT WERE A FRAUD 
CASE TOOK DEFENDANTS BY SURPRISE. 
Appellant had no warnings by pleadings that 
plaintiff under the pleading would present checks, 
of which l1e knew not, for comparison, and had no 
opportunity to present rebuttal testimony by a writ-
nig expert or other check endorsement. 
·see Affidavit in Support of Motion. (p. 115-6) 
Rule 9 (3) (b) of Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
take shall be stated with particularity." 
POINT III. 
THAT THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE IS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF AP-
PELLANT'S DEED, AND PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY 
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT THE 
DEEDS WERE FORGERIES. 
Respondent's testimony in this regard rests 
solely on the so-called expert that signatures as en-
dorsements on two checks are different in some 
respects from the signature on deeds. As against 
such is the testimony of two witnesses present on 
July 26, 1950, and sa'v the actual signing, acknowl-
ment and delivery of the deed to appellant. Also, 
in refutation of the Goddard testin1ony is the testi-
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mony of Louis Thorup, who hurriedly obtained the 
so-called endorsements at night, sometimes without 
Mrs. Thorup's use of glasses, CTr. 20), and that 
sometimes she signed one way sometimes another 
\Vay (Trans. 16) the letters on which Goddard based 
his opinion of difference. 
Also, Appellant was and is in possession of the 
property. 
Leland v. Bourne, 41 U. 425, 125 Pac. 652, at 
657: 
''This is an equity case to quiet the title 
to real property. In such a case both parties 
have a right to invoke our judgment upon the 
whole evidence. If in such a case in our judg-
ment the findings are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence, it is our duty to vacate 
them and substitute others. In this case in our 
judgment the findings are manifestly against 
the great weight of the evidence, and for that 
reason cannot be permitted to stand. * * *" 
In Re Helin's Estate, 55 U. 572, 188 Pac. 633: 
Possession under a deed regular upon its 
face carries with it presumption of regularity 
notwithstanding it was not recorded until 
after death of grantor. 
Ogg v. Gunderson, 168 Pac. (2d) 793: 
"'The primary test of the validity of a 
deed was whether grantor intended to make 
a present transfer, and if such was his inten-
tion, the title of the property thereby passed 
irrevocably to the grantee." 
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POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT RE-
FERRING THE CAUSE ON AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
TO ANOTHER JUDGE. 
See Affidavit. (p. 115) 
Rule 63 (b) of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge VanCott, Jr., just denied the sufficiency 
of the Affidavit and denied the request that the 
cause be referred to another Judge. He, therefore, 
violated the said Rule 63, which provides: 
''* * * If the judge against who the affi-
davit is directed questions the sufficiency of 
the affidavit, he shall enter an order direct-
ing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified 
to another judge (naming him) of the same 
court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which 
judge shall then pass upon the legal suffici-
ency of the affidavit. If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed does not ques-
tion the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or 
if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient another judge 
must be called in to try the case or determine 
the matter in question. 
Coll v. Lo1£,es, Inc. 76 F. Supp. 872. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
AP'PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NE\V TRIAL lVIADE 
ON GROUNDS OF SURPRISE, WRONGFUL PROCE-
DURE AND NEW EVIDENCE. 
This point involves the discussions under Points 
I, II, and III. 
10 
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Affidavits were presented of two witnesses, 
namely: Helen Heins, a close neighbor of Nettie N. 
Thorup, and Bertha H. Morris, a friend of the whole 
Thorup family. Helen Heins swears that Nellie N. 
Thorup before she became ill stated to her that she 
had given or left the home to "Gene", so he should 
have a home. 
Bertha H. Morris swears that Nettie N. Thorup 
told her that: (p. 112) 
''she had a lawyer make out papers giving the 
home property to 'Gene', as she called him. 
She said this home is his." 
Also, appellant's attorney presented, as indi-
cated in an Affidavit in support of Appellant's Mo-
tion, twelve endorsements of Nettie N. Thorup, 
whcih showed that Nettie N. Thorup signed them 
with a "T" and an "N" as in the questioned deed 
in refutation of Goddard's testimony and conclu-
sions based on differences between her writing on 
two singled out checks and appellant's deed. If 
Goddard had picked the twelve check endorsements, 
his testimony and conclusion would have to have 
been different. 
There is no evidence in the record to justify a 
finding that the signature on the deed in question 
is forged. 
See: People v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. 590, 28 Pac. 
597 at 8. 
Here only evidence is (as in the case at bar) 
11 
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of an expert who by comparison was of the opinion 
a certain check was signed by defendant. Held this 
evidence does not prove forgery. 
State v. Swan, 411 Pac. 750, (Kans.) 
:To prove forgery plaintiff must prove 
document signed without authority. 
State v. Jones, 20 Pac. (2d) 614, (Utah) 
To prove forgery it must be shown that 
name of another was signed without author-
ity, and expert evidence by comparison not 
enough. 
Redington v. Woods, 45 Cal. App. 45, 200 Pac. 
1054. 
Held: There is no presumption from a 
difference in handwriting. 
26 C.J.S., Section 34, page 663: 
"It is not essential to the validity of a 
deed that the grantor should actually affix 
his signature thereto with his own hand, and 
the source or nature of its execution is im-
material if he adopts such signature or ac-
knowledges as his own." 
And, of course, there is no pleading to author-
ize a finding of forgery. 
We submit that the Findings and Judgment 




J. GRANT IVERSON 
JAMES M. CARLSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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